In this Online Appendix we first perform robustness exercises on Figure   5 of the main paper. We then present the proofs referenced in the main paper, specifically showing the existence and uniqueness of the solution to the household problem and the shape of fertility across income deciles. We then include our robustness test allowing for the costs and returns to education to change over time. Finally, we discuss the normalization of parameters.
A Cross State Relationship Between the Relative Price of Marketization and High Income Fertility
In this section we explore further the cross-state relationship between changes in high income fertility between 1980 and 2010 and the change in the relative price of marketization, as first introduced in Figure 5 paper.
We estimate regressions of the following structure:
( , is the percentage change in the ratio of the average wage of white non-Hispanic married women in the top two deciles to the average wage in the home production substitute sector in state s. ∆%w ms is the percentage change of the average wage of white non-Hispanic married men in the top two deciles in state s. δ r is a set of region fixed effects for each region r ∈ {Northeast, South, Midwest, West}. ǫ s is an error term. These variables are described in detail in Appendix A of the main paper. All regressions are estimated with robust standard errors.
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s captures the change, over our time period, in the relative price of marketizing a woman's time. Quantitatively, this variable is shown to be crucial for explaining changing fertility patterns in Section 4.4 of the main paper. ∆%w ms captures changes in the demand for children induced by increases in male wages and quantitatively evaluated in Section 4.4 of the main paper. The regional fixed effects are implicitly interacting differentially with time, as all our variables are changes between 1980 and 2010. This allows us to control for differential regional trends. Table 1 describes the results. Column 1 regresses changes in fertility only on changes in the relative price of marketization. Notice that this regression describes the results shown graphically in Figure 5 of the main paper. Column 2 All specifications show a statistically significant and economically meaningful elasticity between fertility and the relative price of marketization, of around 1.
Controlling for changes in men's wages or regional fixed effects do not have meaningful effects on the point estimates or standard errors. Dropping outliers strengthens all specifications, but also increases the standard errors somewhat. In particular, the estimate in Column 6 has a point estimate that is basically the same as its counterpart in Column 3, but has a higher p-value of 0.053. All other specifications are significant at the 1% level. Changes in men's wages do not have a meaningful impact on changes in fertility rates, consistent with their relatively weak effect in the model, documented in Section 4.4 of the main paper. There is a possibility that U (e) is unbounded above, and therefore the household's problem has no solution. We can write the objective function as follows: 
B Proofs
The first step used chain rule of limits, and the second step used L'Hospital's rule since we have a limit of the form ∞ ∞ . Intuitively, βθ α is the weight on quality in the utility function. When this weight is very high, it is possible that the household would like to choose e → ∞ and n → 0, which makes the problem unsolvable. Thus, in order to make the objective function bounded above, we have to impose the restriction βθ α ≤ 1.
Case 1:
In this case, the solution to the household's problem is as follows:
Case 2:
In this case, the first order necessary condition for interior maximum is U ′ (e * ) = 0:
The second order sufficient condition for e * to be a local maximizer is:
Using the first order condition:
Thus, βθ α < 1 guarantees that a solution to the household's problem exists, and the first order necessary condition is a local maximum. Moreover, since the critical point is unique, the local maximum must also be the unique global maximizer.
B.2 Shape of fertility across income deciles
We start with preliminary derivations needed for the proofs below. We focus on the region of parameter values where the solution is interior, i.e. e * > 0. In this case, optimal fertility is given by
Notice that e * > 0 and existence of solution to household's problem, βθ α < 1, imply that n * > 0 and p n − η p e > 0. To analyze the effects on fertility, it suffices to ignore the constant term and focus on the ratio term
. Clearly, n * is increasing in w m as male wages work purely through the positive income effect appearing in the numerator. Female wages, however, affect both the numerator (the positive income effect) and the denominator (the negative price effect). Let E Y,X denote the elasticity of Y with respect to X. It follows that, for small percentage changes in w m and w f , the approximate implied change in n * is given
where the elasticity terms are computed as follows:
The question is how optimal fertility varies across couples that represent different income deciles for a given year, or the same decile across years. These couples differ on w m and w f . From (5) we see that for n * to decline across income deciles in 1980, as was observed in the data, the price effect of %∆w f must dominate the income effect of both %∆w f and %∆w m , where the %∆ ′ s are taken across consecutive income deciles. Moreover, for n * to increase between 1980 and 2010 for couples representing high income deciles, the price effect due to %∆w f must yield to the income effect due to both %∆w f and %∆w m . In this case, the %∆ ′ s refer to changes over time for a fixed decile. Because the effect of w m on n is always positive (E num,w m > 0), we focus on investigating the effect due to w f alone (E num,w f − E denom,w f ). This is done in the two propositions to follow. However, bear in mind that to understand the profile of optimal fertility across income deciles or over time, we need to consider the combined effects of both w m and w f . Proof. Proof of (a). Differentiating (3) with respect to w f and omitting the positive constant term gives
The denominator is positive. To show that the ratio is monotonically increasing, it suffices to show that the negative term in the numerator is made up of positive and monotone decreasing functions of w f . This is seen from obtaining a negative derivative for each of the product terms: 
whenever ρ ∈ (0, 1). It follows that the third limit is
The product of these three limits is zero. It follows that
COROLLARY 1 In the region of w f where the solution is interior, n * is either U-shaped or monotonically increasing in w f .
Proof. Observe from (2) that e * is monotone increasing in w f whenever e * is interior. Thus, there exists a well-defined lowest wage marking the interior solution w f ≡ inf w f |e * w f > 0 . If ∂n * /∂w f w f ≥ 0, i.e. n * is non-decreasing near w f , then we know by proposition 2 that ∂n * /∂w f > 0 for larger w f . In this case, n * is strictly increasing in the region of w f ≥ w f . If, however, ∂n * /∂w f w f < 0, i.e. n * is decreasing in w f near w f , then we know by proposition 2 that ∂n * /∂w f will monotonically increase with w f becoming strictly positive for a large enough w f . In this case, n * is a U-shape function of w f in the region of w f ≥ w f .
C Education Robustness
There has been increasing interest in rising returns to education and rising education costs in the literature. We have so far abstracted from these issues, using the empirical relationship between income and college attainment in 1980 in order to control for changing education rates over time, instead focusing on differential fertility. Is it possible, however, that changes in college returns and costs could be driving changes in differential fertility? In principle, rising education costs could lead to more fertility through a quantity-quality tradeoff, potentially yielding changing patterns of fertility by income. This effect might be mitigated by rising returns to education.
We now allow both the college premium ω, as described in Equation (1) of the main paper, and education costs (p e ) to change over time. Relative to our main experiment for 2010, described in Section 4.4 of the main paper, we only need to describe two things: how p e changes over time and how ω changes.
Children born in 1980 attended college roughly between 1998 and 2002. Thus, we use 2000 as the year to determine costs and returns to college for the 1980 cohort of children. As the 2010 cohort of children has not yet gone to college, we use the 2015 college costs and premium for this cohort. Beginning with p e , we normalize p e,1980 = 1 as before. Although education expenditures map into all possible education-related expenditures per child, we take the stance that college education cost changes accurately describe general changes over time. We therefore choose to proxy the increase in the price of education by the increase in the effective price of college. Using institutional survey data available through the National Center for Education Statistics, we obtain that an annual cost of a public 4-year college is approximately $6,400 in 2000. This includes tuition and room & board, net of grants and scholarships. This quantity for the most recent year available is $7,887, an increase of a 22%. We thus set p e,2010 = 1.22. ω in our model captures the lifetime return to college. This is different from the lifetime college premium which simply refers to the observed difference between the earnings of college graduates and other workers. Thus, we set ω 1980 = 1.29 and ω 2010 = 1.31, representing a 29% and 31% college premium, respectively (Valletta Forthcoming It is then seen from Equation (15) of the main paper that the solution to n will not change due to the scaling above as the product η p e is unchanged, so is p n .
Note that e itself has no data counterpart, but the quantity π (e) is used to target college attainment rates in the data. However, the parameters inside π (·) can be scaled as follows, to keep it unchanged:
Thus, the solution to the model, in terms of n and π (e), is invariant to the following transformation of parameters:
The remaining targets are p m m and t f . It is seen from Equations (11) and (12) of the main paper that these quantities remain unchanged as n remains the same.
D.2 Normalizing p m
In this section we show that we can normalize p m to any value, without affecting any of the meaningful quantities that have a data counterpart: expenditures p n n, p e en and our targeted moments: π, n, p m m, and t f . The solution to p n given in Equation (13) Thus, scaling p m by a factor ε > 0, and adjusting the share parameter and productivity as above, keeps p n fixed. Since p n is unchanged, the model solution remains the same, and so do the targeted moments for n and π.
It remains to show that the targeted moments t f and p m m also remain unchanged.
